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B.: Unity Plan in Dedication of Ways
STUDENT NOTES
inherent right of constitutional courts, grounded in the necessity
of maintaining dignified and orderly judicial procedure, the circuit courts have a valid claim to this weapon. The danger of
malicious attacks on the integrity of the courts, and of premature
discussion of the rights of litigants, is a real one. If the court may
not invoke the summary power to prevent the contennor from
making further attacks while the case is pending, the damage will
be complete before the offender is brought to trial. The contempt
power is a wise preventive measure which the courts have for the
most part used with restraint for the protection of litigants. There
seems to be little feasibility in a legislative denial of its use by the
circuit courts, especially in view of the constitutional protection
against statutory limitation which is afforded the supreme court of
appeals.
G. W. E.

UNITY PLAN IN DEDICATION OF WAYS
The recent case of Huddleston v. Deans gives rise to a problem
over which there is a wide divergence of opinion, namely, the legal
proposition known as the "unity plan"." It has been defined as
a sale of lots with reference to a plat or map delineating streets and
alleys whereby the purchazers acquire a right in all the ways designated thereon.'
Generally it may be said that West Virginia
has adopted the unity plan.F Other jurisdictions limit the rights
of the purchaser to those streets and alleys affording the lot owner
necessary ingress and egress to his property.4 New York extends
the right to those streets on which the lot owner's property abuts
only as far as the first cross-street in each direction.5 Massachusetts
is even more stringent.8
'21 S. E. (2d) 352 (W. Va. 1942).
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In Rudolph v. Glendale Improvement Co., 103 W. Va. 81, 87, 137 S.E. 349
(1927), the court said, "there are strong expressions in .. [Cook v. Totten,
49 W. Va. 177, 38 S. E. 491 (1901) and Edwards v. Moundsville Land Co., 56
W. Va. 43, 48 S. E. 754 (1904)] which would favor the unity rule if a case
solely presenting that question . . .was to be decided. The great weight of
authority sustains the unity rule; and the reasons for its adoption are very
persuasive."
4State v. Hamilton, 109 Tenn. 276, 70 S. W. 619 (1902); Bell v. Todd, 51
Mich. 21, 16 N. W. 304 (1883).
5Reis v. City of New York, 188 N. Y. 58, 80 N. E. 573 (1907).
6See Regan v. Boston Gas & Light Co., 137 Mass. 37 (1884).
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The case of Cook v. Totten points out a fundamental distinction :' selling lots with reference to a plat constitutes dedication
to the public of streets and alleys laid out thereon; but the individual purchasers also acquire the right to the use of the ways
as platted. Furthermore, "While the public right to use and control depends upon the acceptance of the dedication to public uses,
the private right of the purchasers is acquired at the time of the
purchase and may precede the public's right." Tiffany recognizes
the point: "The existence of a right of way in the vendee by reason of a sale to him by reference to a plat is entirely independent of
whether any right exists in the public... is not dependent on the
doctrine of dedication."" The crux of the problem becomes this:
To which right, the private easement of the lot owner or the general
casement of the public, does the unity plan pertain? Or, is it
applicable to both? This writer has been unable to find any case or
textbook differentiating between public and private easements with
regard to the applicability of the unity plan. It is believed that
much of the difficulty in the West Virginia decisions has resulted
from the confusion, in this respect, of these two separate and distinct issues.
Thompson, in his discussion of the unity plan, applies it to
private easements without regard to the question of creation of a
public right by acceptance of the dedication;9 on the other hand,
Elliott asserts that those who purchase lots with reference to the
plat "acquire a right in all the public ways designated thereon
and may enforce the dedication."' 101 'Apparently the former writer
isusing the unity plan in respect to private easements while the
latter relates it to public easements. Rather than an active conflict of views it would appear to be an oblivious disregard of the
distinction. The same criticism may be directed toward the West
Virginia decisions.
In the past our court has, perhaps unconsciously, shuttled between two points. On the one hand it has applied the unity plan;
on the other it has limited the lot owner's rights to those streets
and alleys as are reasonably necessary for convenient access to and
exit from the land conveyed. The case of Cook v. Totten is not
unique among our decisions for having been cited for both propo7 49 W. Va. 177, 38 S. E. 491, 87 Am. St. Rep. 792 (1901).
8 3 TiFFANY, RFAL PROPEary (3d ed. 1939) 312. See also 2 THOMPSON, RAL
PROPERTY 68.

o Id at page 38.

10 1 ELLioTT, STREETs & ROADs 157.
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sitions. In adopting the language of Elliott the court says, "The
unity doctrine of the plat or plan is decidedly the most equitable
." Later in the same case the court declared that the conveyance
"necessarily includes the easement in all the streets and alleys of
the plan necessary to the use, enjoyment and value of the lots.""'
The court in Rudolp v. Glendale Improvement Co.,'- questioned
this as a qualification to the principle that the right extends without
reservation to all the ways outlined on the plat. Therein lies the
difficulty. Was the court in the Totten case confining the unity
plan to public easements created by dedication and acceptance, and
the modified rule of "reasonable necessity" to private easements;
or was it lending support to the unity plan, as applied in either instance, by implying that all the streets and alleys on the plat fall
within the meaning of reasonable necessity? The issue is nicely
circumvented by the undisturbed finding of the trial court, by way
of fact, that all the ways on the plat actually fell within the scope
of reasonable necessity. Confining its analysis of the Totten case
to the qi ere noted above, the court in the Rudolph case, laid aside
the question of public dedication and acceptance and made a direct
application of the unity plan to the private easement of the individual lot owner. "All such streets and alleys are presumed to
be appurtenant to his lot."' 3
In the case of Point Pleasantv. Caldwell, 4 the reasoning of the
court seems influenced by the questionable proposition that acceptance of the dedication necessarily renders the municipality liable for
the maintaining of all accepted streets and alleys in a reasonably
safe condition for travel." Viewing this as an extreme burden on
the town, the court 'reaches the conclusion that the city accepted
only those streets upon which improvements had been made, and
there "was not an acceptance of other streets which had not been
opened or improved, or used by the public. . ." This decision simply refused to apply the unity plan to p-ublie dedication and acceptance; it held that acceptance by public user of a part of the streets
"i See note 6.

12103 W. Va. 81, 137 S.E.349 (1927).
3- Flanagan v. Brown, 107 W. Va. 315, 148 S. E. 113 (1929) is a direct
affirmance of this proposition.
14 87 W. Va. 277, 104 S. E. 610 (1920).
15 Contra: Hast v. Piedmont & C. R.R., 52 W. Va. 396, 44 S. E. 155 (1903):
"In this State our decisions do not allow the public use of a way to operate as
an acceptance of a dedication so as to bind the county" to make repairs (citing
several West Virginia cases). See also, Pence v. Bryant, 54 W. Va. 263, 267,
46 S.E. 275, 277 (1903); Huddleston v. Deans, 21 S.E. (2d) 352, 357 (W.
Va. 1942).
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did not constitute an acceptance of all the streets laid out on the
plat. Without explanation the court in the Huddleston case declared that the Point Pleasant case was distinguishable on factual
grounds. A stronger case may have been developed by rejecting
the basis on which the Point Pleasant decision rested its disapproval
of the unity plan."6
The foregoing case review has been presented for the purpose
of indicating the utter confusion of issues that has beset our court
in its treatment of the problem at hand. The Rudolpz case applied
the unity plan to public easements and the Point Pleasant case refused to apply it; the Totten case applied it to private easements
and the recent case of Deitz v. Johnson resorted instead to the
rule of reasonable necessity. Judge Lovins in the principal case
says that "the necessity of adhering to the unity rule, strongly
upheld by the decisions of this Court, seems clear." However, the
holding confined the rule to public easements. With regard to private easements the court had this to say: "The rights... acquired
by the lot owners are in a measure limited by necessity." Unfortunately, the court makes no effort to explain why the unity
plan is invoked in the one instance and rejected in the other.
It is the belief of this writer, however, that the distinction is
justifiable on the basis of broad principle. It is axiomatic that
rights in the public are superior to private rights. It follows that
they are entitled to wider extension and greater protection in the
interests of general welfare. In light' of the unequal value of the
two classes of rights, sound reason requires the application of
proportionately weighted rules and principles. Without attempting a discussion of the merits of the unity plan as distinguished
from the rule of reasonable necessity, it may be said that a relative
differentiation between the two with regard to their applicability to
the two classes of rights, is desirable.
r
G.S.B.
16

Ibid.

121 W. Va. 711, 6 S. E. (2a) 231 (1939); see also, Mason v. WaU, 96
W. Va. 461, 123 S. E. 457 (1924).
17
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